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1. Introduction
African sleeping sickness (African Trypanosomiases) is a vector-borne disease caused by 
the parasite Trypanosoma brucei (Simarro, Jannin, & Cattand, 2008). The disease is fatal in 
humans if left untreated (Coleman & Welburn, 2004; Davis, Aksoy, & Galvani, 2011) and 
the treatment of livestock has been hindered by drug resistance (Bourn, Grant, Shaw, & 
Torr, 2005; Hargrove, Omolo, Msalilwa, & Fox, 2000; Kajunguri et al., 2014). The disease is 
transmitted by tsetse flies and the most effective strategy to combat the disease is to eliminate 
the vectors (Rowlands et al., 2001). The use of insecticide-treated cattle (ITC) as baits for 
the tsetse flies is an effective vector control method causing little environmental damage 
(Hargrove, Ouifki, Kajunguri, Vale, & Torr, 2012; Kabayo, 2002; Peter, Van den Bossche, 
Penzhorn, & Sharp, 2005; Vale & Torr, 2005). The original ITC protocol was to treat the 
whole body of the adult cattle but an application of insecticide to only legs where the flies 
bite most often (Torr et al., 2001) and to the ears where ticks accumulate, improved the 
cost and efficacy of tsetse control (Torr, Maudlin, & Vale, 2007). Still, to be effective, the 
ITC technique should be applied to a large area to prevent re-infestation by the controlled 
region (Torr & Vale, 2011). It requires participation and cooperation by a large number of 
farmers who are encouraged to control tsetse themselves rather than relying on governments 
(Kajunguri et al., 2014).
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92  K. CRAWfORd eT AL.
Game-theoretical models of individuals facing a decision to either do a disease-preventive 
action (such as to vaccinate or to use ITC) or to risk contracting the disease have become 
increasingly common (Fenichel, Horan, & Hickling, 2010; Reeling & Horan, 2015; Wang 
& Hennessy, 2015). Game theory has been applied to vaccination against major public 
health threats, including smallpox (Bauch, Galvani, & Earn, 2003), measles (Shim et al., 
2012b), rubella (Shim, Kochin, & Galvani, 2009), childhood diseases (Bauch, 2005), influ-
enza (Galvani, Reluga, & Chapman, 2007) and many others. There is no human vaccine 
against African Trypanosomiases (La Greca & Magez, 2011; Tabel, Wei, & Bull, 2013). The 
ITC technique is not a vaccination and does not prevent cattle from contracting the disease 
(Vale, Mutika, & Lovemore, 1999). Still, ITC can be seen as a disease-preventive action as 
the use of ITC reduces the incidence of the disease in the population and it can thus be 
modelled in a similar way as vaccination (Bauch & Earn, 2004).
From the game theoretic perspective, an individual takes an action (such as to use ITC) 
that will maximize personal pay-off, taking into account the disease incidence and risk 
of infection which is determined by actions taken by the rest of the population (Shim, 
Chapman, Townsend, & Galvani, 2012a). In theory, individuals are driven by self-interests 
rather than by the interest of the group (Shim, Meyers, & Galvani, 2011). A usual outcome 
is that as the frequency of preventive actions increases, the incentive to take such an action 
decreases because of indirect protection by other protected individuals (Bauch & Earn, 
2004). This makes the eradication of a disease very difficult and practically impossible, even 
when the cost of the preventive action is very low (Geoffard & Philipson, 1997).
In this paper, we follow a general approach of previous game theoretical models such 
as Bauch and Earn (2004) and apply the approach to a situation where individuals choose 
to use ITC to reduce the tsetse vector prevalence. Unlike in previously studied vaccination 
games, the use of ITC does not prevent the cows contracting the disease (Kajunguri et 
al., 2014), but rather helps to reduce the number of tsetse flies and consequently helps to 
increase the number of healthy cows. Thanks to this indirect but large benefit, our model 
shows that even when the use of ITC is strictly voluntary, the optimal level of protection 
yields the level needed for tsetse elimination, i.e. effectively achieving the herd immunity 
that was not possible in vaccination games.
2. Mathematical model
2.1. Transmission model with ITC
Our model relies heavily on the results and analysis of Kajunguri (2013) and Kajunguri et al. 
(2014). In Kajunguri et al. (2014), the authors present a SIR model involving all the variables 
related to tsetse vector control by ITC in a multi-host population. A slightly modified model 
for one host only (cattle) is shown in Figure 1 and described in this section. The notation 
and model parameters are summarized in Table 1.
The adult cattle population is divided into three classes, susceptible (S), infectious (I) 
and recovered (R), whereas the tsetse population is divided into two classes, susceptible 
(SV) and infectious (IV). To include ITC in the model, we split the cattle population into 
treated (with superscript t) and untreated with (with superscript u). The ITC does not pre-
vent the tsetse fly from biting but each fly that bites or touches a treated cow dies within a 
few hours (Vale, Mutika, & Lovemore, 1999). It means that I and R classes are also divided 
into treated and untreated
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Table 1. notations and parameter values, adapted from Kajunguri et al. (2014).
meaning Value source
Λ host recruitment rate 22 Who (2012)
 host natural mortality .00055 Who (2012)
a Biting rate .25 coleman and Welburn (2004)
 Prob. of transmission from fly to cattle .62 rogers (1988)
 Prob. of transmission from cattle to fly .065 rogers (1988)
T
H
incubation period in host 7 days coleman and Welburn (2004)
T
V
incubation period in flies 18 days coleman and Welburn (2004)
 mortality of infected hosts .006 Davis et al. (2011)
g host recovery rate .014 Davis et al. (2011)
 rate of immunity loss in hosts 1 coleman and Welburn (2004)
B
V
tsetse birth rate 1440 Davis et al. (2011)
Λ
V
tsetse recruitment rate equation (5) Kajunguri et al. (2014)

V
tsetse natural mortality rate .03 rogers (1988)
m tsetse additional mortality due to itc .57 torr et al. (2001)
m
V
tsetse mortality rate with itc equation (4) Kajunguri et al. (2014)
d
−1 Duration of insecticide efficacy 28 days torr et al. (2007)
 Proportion of cattle being treated variable
 stable proportion of treated cattle ∕( + d)
 Force of infection in hosts equation (14)

V
Force of infection in flies equation (15)
C normalized cost of itc per cow per day variable
x Percentage of cattle owned by a focal farmer variable
Figure 1. compartmental model of african sleeping sickness transmission in cattle host and tsetse flies, 
adapted from Kajunguri et al. (2014). there is a time lag due to the incubation period and so at time t, 
(t − T
H
)S(t − T
H
) of cattle leave the susceptible and enters the infections class; here (t − T
H
) is the force 
of infection at time t − T
H
 and S(t − T
H
) is the susceptible population at time t − T
H
. a similar situation 
occurs with tsetse flies where the force of infection is 
V
 and the incubation period is T
V
.
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94  K. CRAWfORd eT AL.
We assume the cattle is treated at rate , thus moving from untreated classes Su, Iu or Ru to 
the treated classes, St , It or Rt. The insecticide effect lasts on average for 1 / d days after which 
the cattle moves from the treated classes, St , It or Rt to the untreated classes Su, Iu or Ru.
The tsetse flies feed on the adult cattle. The feeding rate is a, i.e. each fly takes a new blood 
meal on average every 1 / a days. During the blood meal, the disease is transmitted from an 
infected cow to a fly with probability  and from an infected fly to a cow with probability 
. As in Kajunguri et al. (2014), the time delays TH and TV are representing the incubation 
period in the host and tsetse vector populations, respectively.
The cattle recruitment rate Λ; the rate is given by a combination of the immigration and 
reaching adult size. A newly recruited cow is assumed to be susceptible. However, unlike 
Kajunguri et al. (2014), we assume that the proportion  = ∕( + d) of the recruited cattle 
is treated, i.e. the proportion of treated versus untreated newly recruited cattle is ∕d. This 
assumption is the only deviation from the model described in Kajunguri et al. (2014) and 
we do it in order to make the flow chart in Figure 1 more symmetric which allows us to get 
an analytical solution and postpone the use of computation by one step. The assumption 
can be easily satisfied by treating the newly recruited cattle.
The mortality of the tsetse flies is given by
where V is the natural mortality, N = S + I + R is the total number of cattle and 
(St + It + Rt)∕N is the probability a flies bites a treated cow and m is the additional mor-
tality due to the insecticides.
The recruitment rate of tsetse vectors is derived in Kajunguri et al. (2014) as
where BV is the tsetse birth rate.
The flow chart on Figure 1 then yields the following equations
(1)S = St + Su,
(2)I = It + Iu,
(3)R = Rt + Ru.
(4)mV = V + am
St + It + Rt
N
(5)ΛV =
BV
a +mV
(
1 − exp(−a −mV )
)
(6)
d
dt
Su = (1 − )Λ + Ru + dSt − ( + )Su − (t − TH)S
u(t − TH)
(7)
d
dt
Iu = (t − TH)S
u(t − TH) + dI
t − ( + g + )Iu
(8)
d
dt
Ru = gIu + dRt − ( +  + )R
(9)
d
dt
St = Λ + Su + Rt − (d + )St − (t − TH)S
t(t − TH)
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LeTTeRs In BIOmATHemATICs  95
where
are the forces of infection. As we will later see from (21),  plays a critical role in determining 
the equilibrium value of N, the total count of the cattle. In turn, N is critical in evaluating 
the farmer’s benefits as seen in (20).
2.2. Game-theoretical model
Let us assume that an individual farmer owns a proportion x of all of the cattle in a given 
region that is large enough to prevent an immediate tsetse re-introduction from regions 
with no tsetse control (Torr & Vale, 2011). Let 0 be the average ITC usage among other 
farmers in the area. We want to optimize f , the level of ITC usage of the focal farmer. The 
average usage of ITC in the population is given by
If there are N cattle in total, the focal farmer will have to treat f xN of the existing cattle 
as well as proportion x of the newly recruited cattle (assuming the recruitment of cattle 
is uniform among the farmers). When the system (6)–(13) is in equilibrium, N = Λ and 
thus the total number of treated cattle per day, Ntf , is given by xN(f + ). Assuming x is 
relatively small, we get
Let C be the normalized cost of treatment of one cow per day (assuming benefits of having 
such a cow are equal to 1). We can then evaluate E(f ,0), the focal farmer’s net benefits 
of using strategy f  in the population where everybody else uses strategy 0 by
(10)d
dt
It = Iu + (t − TH)S
t(t − TH) − (d + g + )I
t
(11)
d
dt
Rt = Ru + gIt − (d +  + )Rt
(12)
d
dt
SV = ΛV − exp(−mVTV )V (t − TV )SV (t − TV ) −mVSV
(13)
d
dt
IV = exp(−mVTV )V (t − TV )SV (t − TV ) −mVIV
(14) = a
IV
N
,
(15)V = a
I
N
(16) = xf + (1 − x)0.
(17)Ntf ≈ xN
(
 + 
0
0 + d
)
.
(18)E(f ,0) = xN − CN
t
f
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96  K. CRAWfORd eT AL.
3. Results
When we rewrite system (6)–(11) for S, I, R, we get exactly the system (4)–(8) from Kajunguri 
et al. (2014) (for the model formally without ITC).
Following Kajunguri et al. (2014), we have
where the force of infection  satisfies
and the auxiliary variables a0, b0, c0,A,B,D, F,G,H and the basic reproduction number 
R0 are given by
and
(19)= xN
(
1 − C − C
0
0 + d
)
(20)
= xN
(
1 − Cxf − C(1 − x)0 − C
0
0 + d
)
.
(21)N =
G + H
D + F
(22)
(
a0
2 + bo + c0
)
= 0
(23)R20 =
exp(−mVTV )
m2V
⋅
a2ΛV
Λ(g + )
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
x 10
4
ψ
Pa
yo
ff
 C = 3
 C = 4
 C = 5
 C = 6
Figure 2. Dependence of pay-off E( ,) on the itc level of treatment  for different relative costs of 
treatments C. Parameter values as in table 1. since the farmer uses strategy  as everybody else in the 
population, the value of x is irrelevant in this case.
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LeTTeRs In BIOmATHemATICs  97
(24)a0 = GmV (AaB + GmV )
(25)b0 = AHaBmV + 2HGm
2
V − Aa
2ΛVBD
(26)c0 = Λm
2
V (g + )(1 − R
2
0)
(27)A = exp(−mVTV )
(28)B = Λ( + )
(29)D = g + ( + )
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
λ
ψ
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
0
1
2
3
4
x 10
4
 N
Force of infection, λ
Number of cattle, N
Figure 3. Dependence of force of infection  and the total number of cattle N on the itc level of treatment 
 (this is independent of the relative costs of treatments C). Parameter values as in table 1.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
−400
−200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
ψ
f
Pa
yo
ff
 C = 3
 C = 4
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
x 10
4
ψ
f
Pa
yo
ff
 C = 5
 C = 6
(a) (b)
Figure 4. Dependence of pay-off E(
f
,
0
) on the individual itc level of treatment 
f
 for different relative 
costs of treatments C, 
0
= .003, x = .05, and other parameter values as in table 1. the jump occurs 
exactly when the average level of itc usage  is at the critical value yielding the eradication of the disease.
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98  K. CRAWfORd eT AL.
Substituting (21) into (20) then yields the explicit formula for the focal farmer’s net benefits, 
E(f ,0).
First, assume that everybody uses the same level of ITC. Figure 2 shows the pay-off E( ,) 
for various costs of treatment C, depending on the ITC level . Note the sharp jump at pay-
offs that happens exactly at the value of  where  becomes 0 and where the number of cattle 
jumps from a relatively low to relatively large value, see Figure 3. For relatively small values of 
C, such a critical value of  is optimal from the population perspective (as it yields the highest 
pay-off for the population as a whole) and it is also a value of ITC usage that eradicates the 
tsetse flies and the disease. The disease is eradicated at the same value of  even when the 
cost of ITC is large. However, for such a large C, the critical level of ITC is no longer optimal 
and the pay-off (from the population perspective) is the highest when no ITC is used at all.
We note that while the critical value  is relatively small (less than 1%), the cost of using 
ITC may still be too large for some poorer farmers or some farmers may simply choose not 
to use it. In order to complete the analysis, we thus need to consider a focal farmer using f  
in the population of other farmers using 0 on average and determine the optimal strategy 
for such a farmer. Figure 4 shows that when C is sufficiently small (below the threshold from 
Figure 2), the optimal ITC usage for a focal farmer is exactly such that the overall average 
ITC usage is at the critical value, resulting in the elimination of the disease. However, Figure 
4(b) illustrates that when the cost of using ITC is large, the optimal usage for the individual 
farmer is 0. The same is true when the cost of using ITC is relatively small, but the farmer 
does not own enough cattle, see Figure 5.
(30)F = ( + )(g + )
(31)G = Λ(g +  + )
(32)H = Λ( + )(g + ).
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
−800
−600
−400
−200
0
200
400
ψ
f
Pa
yo
ff
 C = 3
 C = 4
Figure 5. Dependence of pay-off E( ,
0
) on the individual itc level of treatment 
f
 for different relative 
costs of treatments C, 
0
= .003, x = .03, and other parameter values as in table 1. the jump occurs 
exactly when the average level of itc usage  is at the critical value yielding the eradication of the disease. 
however, the value at which the jump occurs is not always optimal. compare to Figure 4.
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4. Conclusions
Following Bauch and Earn (2004), we provided a game-theoretical model to study the 
optimal usage of ITC to combat African sleeping sickness. Our analysis is built on the 
transmission model of sleeping sickness by Kajunguri et al. (2014) that studied the efficiency 
of ITC. For numerical simulations, we focused on the restricted application of ITC, the 
formulae and results for whole body applications are similar.
Not surprisingly, our results indicate that the optimal usage of ITC depends on the cost 
of ITC. From the population perspective (for example, when the usages is mandated/subsi-
died by the government), when the cost of ITC is not prohibitive, the optimal usage of ITC 
yields a complete eradication of the disease; otherwise, when the cost of ITC treatments is 
above a certain threshold, it is optimal not to use ITC at all.
We found that eradication of African sleeping sickness by voluntary usage of ITC is 
possible (again, when the cost of treatment is not prohibitively large). This finding is in 
stark contrast with previous work on voluntary disease prevention, see for example (Bauch, 
2005; Bauch & Earn, 2004; Geoffard & Philipson, 1997). As discussed in Hargrove, Torr, 
& Kindness (2003) and Kajunguri et al. (2014), the real-world success of ITC depends on 
many factors such as the size and shape of the controlled region and the number or den-
sity of treated cattle. Nevertheless, application of ITC can indeed lead to reduction of the 
incidence of sleeping sickness cases (Magona & Walubengo, 2011).
The main reason for such a difference between findings of our analysis and the previous 
work such as Bauch and Earn (2004) lies in the highly bimodal distribution of the benefits. 
In the presence of the disease (i.e. when ITC usage is not enough to eradicate it), the equi-
librium level of cattle and consequently the farmer benefits are much smaller than when 
the ITC usage is at or above the eradication levels. We note that the same feature is present 
in the original Kajunguri et al. (2014) model from which we differed only in treating the 
newly recruited cattle directly. When the cost of ITC is not large and when the farmer has 
a sufficiently large population of cattle that his decision can significantly affect the average 
usage level, the individual interests of the farmer aligns well with the interest of the popu-
lation and the disease can be eradicated.
We note that our model can be further improved. We used a simple pay-off function 
(20) that can be made more realistic by including exact benefits of owning a cow (a per day 
benefit as well as per cow benefit) as well as exact cost of the treatment (set-up costs and 
per cow cost). Moreover, the added benefits of ITC include tick control (Bourn et al., 2005; 
Torr, Maudlin, & Vale, 2007; Vale & Torr, 2005) are not included in our model. For the sake 
of simplicity, we also used only the single-host transmission model from Kajunguri et al. 
(2014) while multi-host models (including humans) are also available and we did not include 
the benefits of smaller disease incidence among humans in our model either. Nevertheless, 
we speculate that adding extra benefits or extending the model for the multi-host situation 
will not qualitatively change the results. The situation may be different if tsetse flies start to 
develop resistance against the treatment. As suggested in Magona and Walubengo (2011), 
a combination of different treatments is likely to minimize the occurrence and spread of 
the resistant parasites.
Also, individuals can have different perceptions of the real situation (Poletti, Ajelli, & 
Merler, 2011) and can base their decision also on different social aspects (Xia & Liu, 2013). 
Providing proper information may thus play an important role in disease eradication. As 
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100  K. CRAWfORd eT AL.
noted in Kajunguri et al. (2014), the model presented here does not work when cattle 
populations are migratory and travel widely through tsetse infested country. Nevertheless, 
game-theoretical models, in general, can still capture the interplay between disease preva-
lence, protective action coverage and individual behaviour (Bauch, 2005) and we can argue 
that since the real benefits to an individual farmer exceeds the benefits considered in our 
simple model, the optimal usage of ITC yields an eradication of the disease even when the 
ITC is voluntary.
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